Self-financing environmental mechanisms
We explore the design of self-financing tax/subsidy mechanisms to solve hold-up problems in environmental regulation. Under Cournot competition, announcing the subsidy rate seems to be preferable to announcing the tax rate. Moreover, for constant marginal damage the hold-up problem can always be sol...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Dokumenttyp: | Buch/Monographie Arbeitspapier |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Munich
Univ., Center for Economic Studies [u.a.]
2005
|
| Schriftenreihe: | CESifo working paper series Resources and environment
1528 |
| In: |
CESifo working papers (1528)
|
| Online-Zugang: |
|
| Verfasserangaben: | Joerg Breitscheidel; Hans Gersbach |
Search Result 1
