Ambiguity and social interaction
We present a non-technical account of ambiguity in strategic games and show how it may be applied to economics and social sciences. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled. We show that pessimism has the effect of increasing (decreasing) equilibrium prices under Courn...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Book/Monograph Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Heidelberg
University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
May 2007
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| Series: | Discussion paper series / Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics
no. 443 |
| In: |
Discussion paper series (no. 443)
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Resolving-System, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127265 Verlag, Volltext: http://www.awi.uni-heidelberg.de/with2/Discussion%20papers/papers/dp443.pdf 
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| Author Notes: | Jürgen Eichberger, David Kelsey and Burkhard C. Schipper |
| Summary: | We present a non-technical account of ambiguity in strategic games and show how it may be applied to economics and social sciences. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled. We show that pessimism has the effect of increasing (decreasing) equilibrium prices under Cournot (Bertrand) competition. In addition the effects of ambiguity on peace-making are examined. It is shown that ambiguity may select equilibria in coordination games with multiple equilibria. Some comparative statics results are derived for the impact of ambiguity in games with strategic complements. |
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| Physical Description: | Online Resource |
| Format: | Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader. |