Granny versus game theorist: ambiguity in experimental games
We report on an experiment in which subjects choose actions in strategic games with either strategic complements or substitutes against a granny, a game theorist or ther subjects. The games are selected in order to test predictions on the comparative statics of equilibrium with respect to changes in...
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| Other Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Book/Monograph Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Davis, Calif.
Dep. of Economics, Univ. of California
26 Sept. 2006
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| Series: | Working papers / University of California, Department of Economics
06,27 |
| In: |
Working papers (06,27)
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Verlag, Volltext: http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/working_papers/06-27.pdf Download aus dem Internet, Stand: 15.07.2008, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31332 
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| Author Notes: | Burkhard Schipper; Juergen Eichberger; David Kelsey |
| Summary: | We report on an experiment in which subjects choose actions in strategic games with either strategic complements or substitutes against a granny, a game theorist or ther subjects. The games are selected in order to test predictions on the comparative statics of equilibrium with respect to changes in strategic ambiguity. We find that subjects face higher ambiguity while playing against the granny than playing against the game theorist if we assume that subjects are ambiguity averse. Moreover, under the same assumption, subjects choose more secure actions in games more prone to ambiguity which is in line with the predictions. |
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| Physical Description: | Online Resource |
| Format: | Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader. |