Least unmatched price auctions: a first approach
Least-Unmatched Price Auctions have become a popular format of TV and radio shows. Increasingly, they are also applied in internet trading. In these auctions the lowest single (unique) bid wins. We analyze the game-theoretic solution of least unmatched price auctions when prize, bidding cost and the...
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| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Dokumenttyp: | Book/Monograph Arbeitspapier |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Heidelberg
University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
July 2008
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| Schriftenreihe: | Discussion paper series / Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics
no. 471 |
| In: |
Discussion paper series (no. 471)
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Resolving-System, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127294 Verlag, Volltext: http://www.awi.uni-heidelberg.de/with2/Discussion%20papers/papers/dp471.pdf 
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| Verfasserangaben: | Jürgen Eichberger and Dmitri Vinogradov |
| Zusammenfassung: | Least-Unmatched Price Auctions have become a popular format of TV and radio shows. Increasingly, they are also applied in internet trading. In these auctions the lowest single (unique) bid wins. We analyze the game-theoretic solution of least unmatched price auctions when prize, bidding cost and the number of participants are known. We use a large data-set of such auctions in order to contrast actual behavior of players with game-theoretic predictions. In the aggregate, bidding behaviour seems to conform with a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. |
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| Beschreibung: | Online Resource |
| Dokumenttyp: | Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader. |