A dynamic Ellsberg urn experiment
Two rationality arguments are used to justify the link between conditional and unconditional preferences in decision theory: dynamic consistency and consequentialism. Dynamic consistency requires that ex ante contingent choices are respected by updated preferences. Consequentialism states that only...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
|---|---|
| Dokumenttyp: | Buch/Monographie Arbeitspapier |
| Sprache: | Deutsch Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Heidelberg
Universitätsbibliothek der Universität Heidelberg
September 2009
Heidelberg University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics September 2009 |
| Schriftenreihe: | Discussion paper series / Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics
no. 487 |
| In: |
Discussion paper series (no. 487)
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Resolving-System, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-opus-98286 Verlag, Volltext: http://www.awi.uni-heidelberg.de/with2/Discussion%20papers/papers/dp487.pdf Resolving-System, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127306 
|
| Verfasserangaben: | Adam Dominiak, Peter Dürsch, and Jean-Philippe Lefort |
| Zusammenfassung: | Two rationality arguments are used to justify the link between conditional and unconditional preferences in decision theory: dynamic consistency and consequentialism. Dynamic consistency requires that ex ante contingent choices are respected by updated preferences. Consequentialism states that only those outcomes which are still possible can matter for updated preferences. We test the descriptive validity of these rationality arguments with a dynamic version of Ellsberg's three color experiment and find that subjects act more often in line with consequentialism than with dynamic consistency. |
|---|---|
| Beschreibung: | Online publiziert: 2009 |
| Beschreibung: | Online Resource |
| Dokumenttyp: | Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader. |