Unbeatable Imitation
We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule "imitate-the-best" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and show that it can only be beaten by much in games that...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Book/Monograph Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Heidelberg
Universitätsbibliothek der Universität Heidelberg
February 18, 2010
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| Series: | Discussion paper series / Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics
No. 499 |
| In: |
Discussion paper series (no. 499)
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Resolving-System, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-opus-105444 Resolving-System, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127315 Verlag, Volltext: http://www.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/archiv/10544 Verlag, Volltext: http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/volltexte/2010/10544/pdf/duersch_2010_dp499.pdf 
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| Author Notes: | Peter Duersch; Jörg Oechssler; Burkhard C. Schipper |
| Summary: | We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule "imitate-the-best" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and show that it can only be beaten by much in games that are of the rock-scissors-paper variety. Thus, in many interesting examples, like 2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, price competition, rent seeking, public goods games, common pool resource games, minimum effort coordination games, arms race, search, bargaining, etc., imitation cannot be beaten by much even by a very clever opponent. |
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| Item Description: | Online publiziert: 2010 |
| Physical Description: | Online Resource |
| Format: | Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader. |