Unbeatable Imitation
We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule "imitate-the-best" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and show that it can only be beaten by much in games that...
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
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| Dokumenttyp: | Buch/Monographie Arbeitspapier |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Heidelberg
Universitätsbibliothek der Universität Heidelberg
February 18, 2010
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| Schriftenreihe: | Discussion paper series / Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics
No. 499 |
| In: |
Discussion paper series (no. 499)
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Resolving-System, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-opus-105444 Resolving-System, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127315 Verlag, Volltext: http://www.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/archiv/10544 Verlag, Volltext: http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/volltexte/2010/10544/pdf/duersch_2010_dp499.pdf 
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| Verfasserangaben: | Peter Duersch; Jörg Oechssler; Burkhard C. Schipper |
| Zusammenfassung: | We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule "imitate-the-best" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and show that it can only be beaten by much in games that are of the rock-scissors-paper variety. Thus, in many interesting examples, like 2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, price competition, rent seeking, public goods games, common pool resource games, minimum effort coordination games, arms race, search, bargaining, etc., imitation cannot be beaten by much even by a very clever opponent. |
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| Beschreibung: | Online publiziert: 2010 |
| Beschreibung: | Online Resource |
| Dokumenttyp: | Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader. |