Pure saddle points and symmetric relative payoff games
It is well known that the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure saddle point. We show that this holds more generally: A symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors game. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcav...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Book/Monograph Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Heidelberg
Universitätsbibliothek der Universität Heidelberg
February 21, 2010
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| Series: | Discussion paper series / Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics
No. 500 |
| In: |
Discussion paper series (no. 500)
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Resolving-System, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-opus-105453 Resolving-System, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127322 Verlag, Volltext: http://www.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/archiv/10545 Verlag, Volltext: http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/volltexte/2010/10545/pdf/duersch_2010_dp500.pdf 
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| Author Notes: | Peter Duersch; Jörg Oechssler; Burkhard C. Schipper |
| Summary: | It is well known that the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure saddle point. We show that this holds more generally: A symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors game. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point. Further sufficient conditions for existence are provided. We apply our theory to a rich collection of examples by noting that the class of symmetric two-player zero-sum games coincides with the class of relative payoff games associated with symmetric two-player games. This allows us to derive results on the existence of a finite population evolutionary stable strategies. |
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| Item Description: | Online publiziert: 2010 |
| Physical Description: | Online Resource |
| Format: | Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader. |