Pure saddle points and symmetric relative payoff games

It is well known that the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure saddle point. We show that this holds more generally: A symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors game. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcav...

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Hauptverfasser: Dürsch, Peter (VerfasserIn) , Oechssler, Joerg (VerfasserIn) , Schipper, Burkhard (VerfasserIn)
Dokumenttyp: Buch/Monographie Arbeitspapier
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Heidelberg Universitätsbibliothek der Universität Heidelberg February 21, 2010
Schriftenreihe:Discussion paper series / Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics No. 500
In: Discussion paper series (no. 500)

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Online-Zugang:Resolving-System, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-opus-105453
Resolving-System, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127322
Verlag, Volltext: http://www.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/archiv/10545
Verlag, Volltext: http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/volltexte/2010/10545/pdf/duersch_2010_dp500.pdf
Volltext
Verfasserangaben:Peter Duersch; Jörg Oechssler; Burkhard C. Schipper
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:It is well known that the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure saddle point. We show that this holds more generally: A symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors game. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point. Further sufficient conditions for existence are provided. We apply our theory to a rich collection of examples by noting that the class of symmetric two-player zero-sum games coincides with the class of relative payoff games associated with symmetric two-player games. This allows us to derive results on the existence of a finite population evolutionary stable strategies.
Beschreibung:Online publiziert: 2010
Beschreibung:Online Resource
Dokumenttyp:Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader.