The costs of favoritism: is politically-driven aid less effective?
As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that project...
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| Format: | Book/Monograph Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Göttingen
[Courant Research Centre: Poverty, Equity and Growth]
2010
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| Series: | Discussion papers / Courant Research Centre "Poverty, Equity and Growth in Developing and Transition Countries"
26 |
| In: |
Discussion papers (26)
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| Online Access: | Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://www2.vwl.wiso.uni-goettingen.de/courant-papers/CRC-PEG_DP_26.pdf Download aus dem Internet, Stand: 01.04.2014, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/90458 
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| Author Notes: | Axel Dreher ... |
| Summary: | As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated - such as those granted to governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank - are no more likely, on average, to get a negative quality rating than other projects. When aid is given to Security Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World Bank project quality suffers as a consequence of political influence only when the recipient country is economically vulnerable in the first place. |
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| Physical Description: | Online Resource |
| Format: | Systemvoraussetzung: Acrobat Reader. |