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Flexible majority rules

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In this paper we introduce flexible majority decision rules where the size of the majority depends on the proposal made by the agenda setter. Flexible majority rules can mitigate the disadvantages of democracies in the provision of public projects. In many cases, the combination of the principles ta...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Erlenmaier, Ulrich (Author) , Gersbach, Hans (Author)
Format: Book/Monograph Working Paper
Language:English
Published: München CESifo 2001
Series:CESifo Working Paper 464
In: CESifo working papers (464)

Subjects:
Arbeitspapier
Graue Literatur
Wohlfahrtseffekt
Steuerpolitik
Öffentliches Gut
Online Access:Resolving-System, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75833
Verlag, Volltext: http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoWP/CESifoWPdetails?wp_id=14560994
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Author Notes:Ulrich Erlenmaier; Hans Gersbach
Description
Summary:In this paper we introduce flexible majority decision rules where the size of the majority depends on the proposal made by the agenda setter. Flexible majority rules can mitigate the disadvantages of democracies in the provision of public projects. In many cases, the combination of the principles taxation constraint to majority winners, a ban on subsidies, costly agenda setting and flexible majority rules constitute a socially optimal democratic constitution. Flexible majority rules might also be a useful decision-making procedure in other circumstances.
Physical Description:Online Resource
Format:Systemvoraussetzungen: PDF Reader.

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