Competitive markets, collective decisions and group formation
We consider a general equilibrium model where groups operating in a competitive market environment can have several members and make efficient collective consumption decisions. Individuals have the option to leave the group and make it on their own or join another group. We study the effect of these...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Book/Monograph Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Munich
CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute
May 2003
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| Series: | CESifo working paper Category 10: Empirical and Theoretical Methods
no. 953 |
| In: |
CESifo working papers (no. 953)
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Resolving-System, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76403
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| Author Notes: | Hans Gersbach, Hans Haller |
| Summary: | We consider a general equilibrium model where groups operating in a competitive market environment can have several members and make efficient collective consumption decisions. Individuals have the option to leave the group and make it on their own or join another group. We study the effect of these outside options on group formation, group stability, equilibrium existence, and equilibrium efficiency. |
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| Physical Description: | Online Resource |