Public in-kind relief and private self-insurance

In the wake of several high-profile natural disasters, crowding effects between public relief and private investments in disaster preparedness have recently attracted renewed attention. We examine how non-hypothetical self-insurance behavior by households responds to variations in public investments...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Goeschl, Timo (Author) , Managi, Shunsuke (Author)
Format: Book/Monograph Working Paper
Language:English
Published: Heidelberg University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics June 2017
Series:Discussion paper series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics no. 633
In: Discussion paper series (no. 633)

DOI:10.11588/heidok.00023029
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Online Access:Resolving-System, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://dx.doi.org/10.11588/heidok.00023029
Resolving-System, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-230297
Resolving-System, kostenfrei, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.11588/heidok.00023029
Resolving-System, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/162976
Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://www.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/archiv/23029
Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/23029/1/__ad.uni-heidelberg.de_wiso_u.arnold_Desktop_633%2C%20June%202017.pdf
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Author Notes:Timo Goeschl and Shunsuke Managi
Description
Summary:In the wake of several high-profile natural disasters, crowding effects between public relief and private investments in disaster preparedness have recently attracted renewed attention. We examine how non-hypothetical self-insurance behavior by households responds to variations in public investments in relief capabilities based on a large disaster preparedness survey (n = 19,071) conducted in Japan in 2012. The preparedness measure used is emergency drinking water storage, defining a setting in which (i) government provides in-kind, rather than cash, relief and (ii) the crowding effect observed is more apt to be total, rather than partial. In contrast to much of the literature studying crowding effects of cash relief, there is little evidence for crowding out in emergency drinking water, with an upper bound of 2 percent at the intensive margin.
Physical Description:Online Resource
DOI:10.11588/heidok.00023029