On the benefit of a phenomenological revision of problem solving
Problem solving has been empirical psychology's concern for half a century. Cognitive science's work on this field has been stimulated especially by the computational theory of mind. As a result, most experimental research originates from a mechanistic approach that disregards genuine expe...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article (Journal) |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
20 Oct 2017
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| In: |
Journal of phenomenological psychology
Year: 2017, Volume: 48, Issue: 2, Pages: 240-258 |
| ISSN: | 1569-1624 |
| DOI: | 10.1163/15691624-12341330 |
| Online Access: | Verlag, Pay-per-use, Volltext: http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15691624-12341330
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| Author Notes: | Alexander Nicolai Wendt |
| Summary: | Problem solving has been empirical psychology's concern for half a century. Cognitive science's work on this field has been stimulated especially by the computational theory of mind. As a result, most experimental research originates from a mechanistic approach that disregards genuine experience. On the occasion of a review of problem solving's foundation, a phenomenological description offers fruitful perspectives. Yet, the mechanistic paradigm is currently dominant throughout problem solving's established patterns of description. The review starts with a critical historical analysis of the state of problem solving in academic psychology. Subsequently, a phenomenological, contrastive approach is proposed. It questions the notion of problems as "goal-driven" behavior by making vivid experience the subject of discussion. As its given compounds, solvability, oppressiveness, and the problem's horizon are discussed. Ultimately, an experience- based multimodal notion of the problem is elaborated that relates problems to challenges, fatalities and opportunities as different types of situations. |
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| Item Description: | Gesehen am 25.02.2019 |
| Physical Description: | Online Resource |
| ISSN: | 1569-1624 |
| DOI: | 10.1163/15691624-12341330 |