On the benefit of a phenomenological revision of problem solving

Problem solving has been empirical psychology's concern for half a century. Cognitive science's work on this field has been stimulated especially by the computational theory of mind. As a result, most experimental research originates from a mechanistic approach that disregards genuine expe...

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1. Verfasser: Wendt, Alexander Nicolai (VerfasserIn)
Dokumenttyp: Article (Journal)
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: 20 Oct 2017
In: Journal of phenomenological psychology
Year: 2017, Jahrgang: 48, Heft: 2, Pages: 240-258
ISSN:1569-1624
DOI:10.1163/15691624-12341330
Online-Zugang:Verlag, Pay-per-use, Volltext: http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15691624-12341330
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Verfasserangaben:Alexander Nicolai Wendt
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Zusammenfassung:Problem solving has been empirical psychology's concern for half a century. Cognitive science's work on this field has been stimulated especially by the computational theory of mind. As a result, most experimental research originates from a mechanistic approach that disregards genuine experience. On the occasion of a review of problem solving's foundation, a phenomenological description offers fruitful perspectives. Yet, the mechanistic paradigm is currently dominant throughout problem solving's established patterns of description. The review starts with a critical historical analysis of the state of problem solving in academic psychology. Subsequently, a phenomenological, contrastive approach is proposed. It questions the notion of problems as "goal-driven" behavior by making vivid experience the subject of discussion. As its given compounds, solvability, oppressiveness, and the problem's horizon are discussed. Ultimately, an experience- based multimodal notion of the problem is elaborated that relates problems to challenges, fatalities and opportunities as different types of situations.
Beschreibung:Gesehen am 25.02.2019
Beschreibung:Online Resource
ISSN:1569-1624
DOI:10.1163/15691624-12341330